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NOTES
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a
Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance

Since World War II American Presidents have claimed constitutional authority to conduct wiretapping and electronic surveillance
for national security purposes. 1 Successive Presidents have sought to
expand the scope of this claimed authority2 and to protect it from
judicial and legislative limitations.3 For three decades courts failed
to strike a clear balance between the President's national security
surveillance powers and citizens' fourth amendment rights. 4 Congress, on its part, deferred to presidential claims of inherent authority in the national security area5 until the abuses revealed during the
Watergate scandals increased anxiety over the executive's exclusive
I. See text at notes 12-21 i'!fra. This Note concerns electronic surveillance rather than
unaided personal surveillance. The term "surveillance" refers to interception of wire, radio, or
oral communications through the use of an electronic, mechanical, or other device. For specific statutory definitions of this term, see Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, § 2510, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1976); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, § lOI(f), 50 U.S.C. § 180l(f) (Supp. II 1978). The term "foreign intelligence surveillance" refers to electronic national security surveillance conducted within the United States for
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. When the purpose of national security surveillance is to gather domestic intelligence, the fourth amendment requires the government to seek
a warrant before conducting the surveillance. United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 314-21, 323-24 (1972). See text at notes 39-47 In/hr, note 31 infra.
2. See text at notes 12-21 infra. See generally Bernstein, The Road to Watergate and Beyond· The Growth andAbuse ofExecutive Authority Since 1940, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 58
(Spring 1976).
3. See, e.g., Right of Privacy Act, S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (President Johnson's
proposed legislation to prohibit electronic eavesdropping except in national security cases);
Brief for the United States at 9-11, 15-19, 29-34, United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972); compare SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL
AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, s. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in (1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2112, 2156-57, 2182-83, with Additional Views of Mr. Hart on
Title III of S. 917, S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in (1968) U.S. CooE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2227, 2235-36.
4. See text at notes 12-27 i'!fra.
5. The warrant requirements established in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C,
§§ 2510-2520 (1976)), did not apply to the gathering of foreign intelligence information. See
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976). Congressional proposals to regulate national security surveillance
were relatively common after Watergate. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); National Security Surveillance Act of 1975, S, 743,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Freedom from Surveillance Act of 1974, S. 4062, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); Surveillance Procedures Act of 1973, S. 2820, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); SENATE
SELECT COMM, TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERI•
CANS,
REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 265-341 (1976), reprinted in THE INTELLIGENCI!
COMMUNITY 872-947 (T. Fain ed. 1977). None of the proposed bills, however, reached a vote
in either chamber until 1978.
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exercise of the surveillance power. 6 This concern led the Ninety-fifth
Congress to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
[FISA].7 The FISA requires the executive to seek court approval
before employing electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence within the United States. The Act creates a special court to
hear government warrant requests and establishes judicial standards
that limit the circumstances in which warrants can be issued. The
Act also imposes civil and criminal penalties for conducting unauthorized surveillance or using information so obtained. 8
Congressional opponents of the FISA argued that the bill was
invalid under the separation of powers doctrine because it encroached on the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign intelligence activities within the United States.9 Although
Congress passed the FISA over these objections, the courts have not
yet resolved this constitutional issue. It is foreseeable that an executive agency or employee will respond to a civil or criminal prosecution for unwarranted surveillance by questioning the Act's
constitutionality. 10
6. The view that unrestrained executive power might lead to abuse preceded Watergate,
see, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 264-66, 377 (1973); see also w.
LAFEBER, AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE COLD WAR: 1945-1971, at 298 (2d ed. 1972); THE
PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG 342 (A. Vandenberg, Jr. ed. 1952), but it was only
after the actual abuses revealed during the Watergate scandals that anxiety about the executive's misuse of power became a prominent part of American political culture. See, e.g., 3
CURRENT OPINION 94 (1975) (Americans believe that government wrongdoing and lack of
leadership are leading causes of nation's problems); cf. 4 CURRENT OPINION 62 (1976) (sixty
percent of Iowans feel Congress should dominate foreign policy); 4 CURRENT OPINION 61-62
(1976) (growing public aversion to "big government"); 2 CURRENT OPINION 4 (1974) (five to
four majority favors Congress limiting President's war-making powers).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (Title I to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811
(Supp. II 1978)) [hereinafter cited as FISAJ. The conference committee report is H. R. REP.
No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4048. Debate and final passage are reported in 124 CONG. REC. Sl4,882-84 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978) and
124 CONG. REC. Hl2,533-43 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978). See Berlow, Wiretaps Control Bill Sent
to President, 36 CONG. Q. 2964 (1978).
8. FISA § 110 provides that any person, other than a foreign power or an employee or
officer of a foreign power, who has been the subject of electronic surveillance or about whom
information obtained by surveillance has been improperly disclosed may bring a civil action
seeking recovery of "actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100
per day for each day of violation, whichever is greater," punitive damages, and reasonable
attorney's fees. Section 109 provides that any person who intentionally engages in electronic
surveillance under color oflaw except as authorized by'statute, or who discloses or uses information so obtained knowing that the surveillance was unauthorized, is guilty of a crime punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
9. See, e.g., Dissenting Views on the Conference Report to Accompany S. 1566, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,682, HI 1,683-84 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978).
10. The Carter administration supported the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, see S.
REP. No. 604, Part I, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in [1978) U.S. CooE CONG. &
Ao. NEWS 3904, 3905; Bell, Electronic Surveillance and the Free Society, 23 ST. Loms U. L.J. I,
7-9 (1979), and President Carter signed the Act into law, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
1853 (Oct. 27, 1978). Nevertheless, even the Carter administration may eventually challenge
the Act in court. While the Act was pending before Congress, President Carter approved war-

1118

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:1116

This Note evaluates the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Section I summarizes the legal history of
national security surveillance from 1940 until the passage of the
FISA, and briefly discusses the three major circuit court rulings on
warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance. Section II describes the
provisions of the Act. 11 Section III examines the Act's constitutionality, first considering the scope of congressional authority to regulate the conduct of foreign affairs, then considering whether the
political question doctrine prevents judicial scrutiny of executive decisions to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance. The Note concludes that the FISA is an appropriate and constitutional exercise of
congressional authority to accommodate presidential power and
fourth amendment rights, and that the political question doctrine
does not bar judicial review of executive foreign intelligence surveillance requests.
I.

THE LEGAL HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE

. In 1928 the Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead v. United States 12
that domestic wiretapping and surveillance was beyond the reach of
fourth amendment protections unless accomplished by physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area. 13 Olmstead left the burrantless foreign intelligence surveillance of at least one citizen within the United States. See
Chagnon v. Bell, 568 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1979), offd. No. 79-1232 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 1980);
United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978) offd sub nom. United States v.
Truong, No. 78-5176 (4th Cir. July 17, 1980). Whether such surveillances continued after the
Act's passage is unknown. Moreover, President Carter's signing of the bill will not bind future
administrations which might oppose the Act on policy or constitutional grounds. See National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 n.12 (1976).
There is also debate whether the FISA goes far enough. One commentator questions the
ability of a foreign security surveillance warrant requirement to adequately safeguard personal
liberty, Note, Present and Proposed Standards for Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance,
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 109, 120-22 (1976). Another commentator views appearance before a neutral magistrate as an effective deterrent to the most questionable surveillances, Comment, Electronic Surveillance - Foreign Intelligence - Wiretapping of an Alien Spy far Foreign
Intelligence Purposes J)oes Not Violate Communications Act of1934 or Fourth Amendment U.S. v. Butenko, 8 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & PoL. 479, 517 (1976). A careful middle ground,
offering hope for a warrant requirement but cautioning against excessive optimism, is offered
in Lacovara, Presidential Power to Gather Intelligence: The Tension Between Article II and
Amendment IV, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 106, 126-31 (Summer 1976).
This Note does not debate the efficacy of the FISA. That issue is best resolved from experience with the Act. The Attorney General is required to regularly inform the House and Senate
Select Committees on Intelligence of this experience. FISA § l08(a).
11. For discussion of the Act's predecessor, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), see Note, Foreign Security Surveillance-Balancing
Executive Power and the Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV, 1179 (1977). For an extensive discussion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 before Senate and House
action and conference committee amendments, see Shapiro, The Foreign lntelllgence Surve/1lance Act: Legislative Balancing ofNational Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV, J,
LEGIS. 119 {1977).
12. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
13. 277 U.S. at 464. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). But cf. Silverman v. United
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den of regulating domestic surveillance to Congress. Congress
responded by enacting section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934, 14 which prohibits both unauthorized interception of any private radio or wire communications and unauthorized use or publication of any information contained in such communications. In
Nardone v. United States, the Supreme Court held that evidence collected in violation of section 605 was inadmissible in federal criminal
trials. 15
Section 605 and the Nardone ruling had little impact on national
security surveillance for two reasons. First, the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence only deterred national security surveillance when the government's objectives were limited to successful
criminal prosecutions. Since collection of information was often in
itself the government's primary motive, the exclusion of evidence
was an ineffective deterrent 16 • Second, the executive branch concluded that section 605 did not apply to national security investigations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, while agreeing with the
"broad purpose of the [Nardone] decision relating to wiretapping investigations," remained "convinced that the Supreme Court never
intended any dictum . . . to apply to grave matters involving the
defense of the nation." 17 Thus in 1940 he authorized Attorney General Robert Jackson to approve wiretaps and to direct federal agents
"to secure information by listening devices direct[ed] to the conversation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive
activities against the Government of the United States, including
suspected spies." 18 Although Roosevelt requested both that these investigations be directed, insofar as possible, against aliens alone and
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (spike microphone pushed through party wall and touching heating
duct constituted physical intrusion).
14. Ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)). See
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Nardone J]; Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Nardone I.I].
15. Nardone I, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Nardone sought to exclude evidence obtained through
a wiretap by federal agents. The agents had not invaded a "constitutionally protected area,"
see, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961), and the Court had not yet
applied the fourth amendment to non-trespassory invasions of privacy, see Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). In Nardone I, the Court held section 605 applicable to law
enforcement agents and barred the introduction of wiretap records, 302 U.S. at 383; in Nardone
II, the Court barred the introduction of evidence derived from the wiretap, the "fruits" of the
illegal surveillance. 308 U.S. at 340-43.
16. Some law enforcement officials did believe that section 605 unduly restrained them
when their object was successful criminal investigation and prosecution. See, e.g., Report by
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 17ze Challenge
of Crime in a Free Society (1967); Rogers, 17ze Casefar Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 79397 (1954).
17. Confidential Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert H. Jackson (May
21, 1940), reprintedin Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673-74 app. (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
bane}, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
18. 516 F.2d at 674 app.
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that they be limited in number, 19 later Presidents expanded surveillance beyond these limits. In 1946 President Truman accepted Attorney General Clark's proposal for an expanded surveillance
program. Clark's plan did not limit surveillance to aliens; instead, it
proposed the use of "these special investigative measures in domestic
cases."20 Electronic surveillance was used increasingly by each succeeding administration.21
Throughout this period of expansion, the legal doctrines governing wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping remained
fairly static. A dramatic turnabout in 1967 upset this equilibrium.
In Katz v. United States, 22 the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead
and held for the first time that warrantless electronic surveillance
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment. 23 The Court held that government officers must obtain
a warrant from a neutral magistrate24 before employing wiretapping
or electronic surveillance in the course of any state25 or federal criminal investigation. But the Court presaged a possible exception:
Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.26

This national security exception permitted increasing warrantless
surveillance within the United States. 27
19. 516 F.2d at 674 app.
20. Letter from Tom C. Clark to Harry S. Truman (July 17, 1946), reprinted in Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 674 app.
21. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BOOK Ill: FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLI·
GENCE, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 301 (1976). See also, Lacovara supra note 10, at
106, 107-09. See generally Bernstein, supra note 2.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
24. 389 U.S. at 356.
25. The fourteenth amendment applies the fourth amendment to the states. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963), had established that the same "standards of reasonableness" required of the federal government under the fourth amendment are also required of the states.
This holding was applied in a surveillance case, albeit one involving an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
26. 389 U.S. at 358 n.23. Although the Court did not answer this question, three Justices
briefly expressed their views on the national security exception in concurring opinions. Justice
White argued that the President's article II powers and duties require an exception to the
warrant requirement for national security cases. White offered no lengthy analysis or precedent supporting his conclusion. 389 U.S. at 364. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan,
opposed the exception proposed by Justice White, arguing that the President's and Attorney
General's duties to "vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate federal laws" make it impossible for them to act as "disinterested,
neutral magistrate[s]." 389 U.S. at 359-60.
27. See, e.g., Surveillance Practices and Procedures Act of1973: Hearings on S. 2820 Before
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In response to Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.28 This Act set out procedures by which government officials could obtain warrants for
electronic surveillance in criminal investigations. Unlike section 605
of the Communications Act of 1934, which simply prohibited all persons from intercepting wire and radio communications in most circumstances,29 Title III set standards for court approval of these types
of surveillance.30 Section 605 provided penalties for violations by
any person; Title III punished only illegal surveillance under color of
law.
The standards of Title III of the Safe Streets Act failed to narrow
the Katz exception because they did not apply to national security
surveillances, whether classified as domestic or foreign. 31 Moreover,
section 2511(3) of Title III disclaimed any congressional intent to
expand or contract the President's authority "to obtain foreign intelthe Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures ef the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1974) (statement of Attorney General William B. Saxbe) (asserting a right
to break into a citizen's home without a warrant and search for items that might be used in
foreign espionage or intelligence cases); 6 Political Abuse and the FBL· Hearings on S. Res. 21
Before the Senate Select Comm. lo Study Governmental Operations with Respect lo Intelligence
Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). "National security" was the justification for some of
the most flagrant abuses of the Nixon administration. See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 606
F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2915 (1980) (suit over 21-month warrantless wiretap of former National Security Council employee); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. appliedfor, No. 79-882 (Dec. 7, 1979) (warrantless wiretap of New York
Times reporter); United States v. Russo and Ellsberg, No. 9373 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973)
(dismissal for government failure to produce wiretap records); H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 146 (1974) (Second Impeachment Article charging President Nixon with authorizing
"Electronic Surveillance or Other Investigations for Purposes Unrelated to National Security,
the Enforcement of Laws or Any Other Lawful Function of His Office"; the report concluded
that these surveillances were for "political purposes," id. at 35); 2 Hearings Before the Senate
Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect lo Intelligence Activities, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 141-88, reprinted in THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 817-71 (T. Fain ed. 1977)
(revealing the "Huston Plan,'' which proposed wiretaps of various domestic political groups
without judicial approval); Hearings on the Role ef J)r. Henry Kissinger in the Wiretapping ef
Certain Government Officials and Newsmen Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activili'es,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("Watergate" el al); 119 CONG. REC. 41864 (1973) (invocation by
White House officials of national security justification for inducing the CIA to assist in the
burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office).
28. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)). See, S.
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-76 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 2112, 2153-63.
29. 47 u.s.c. § 605 (1976).
30. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)).
31. Whether an organization, and presumably the threat caused by that organization, is
domestic or foreign is determined on the basis of its composition - U.S. citizens or noncitizens - and its connections - the significance of its "connection with a foreign power, its
agents or agencies." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309 n.8
(1972). Bui cf. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613-14 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane)
(plurality opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (threat posed by domestic Jewish Defense
League was foreign security since its actions provoked a foreign power, the Soviet Union).
This part of the Zweibon decision is criticized in Case Comment, Title III and National Security Surveillances, 56 B.U. L. REv. 776, 787-89 (1976).
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ligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities."32 In passing the Act in 1968, "Congress simply
left presidential powers where it found them." 33
Four years later, in United States v. United States .District
Court, 34 the Justice Department asked the Supreme Court to determine the scope of the President's power to approve a warrantless
wiretap under the national security exception to the requirements of
Title III. United States .District Court, however, involved only "the
domestic aspects of national security."35 Richard Plamondon, who
had been indicted for the bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, sought disclosure of the Government's electronic surveillance records and a hearing to determine whether the Government
had used information from warrantless wiretaps to support his indictment. The Government claimed that its surveillance, though
warrantless, was a lawful exercise of presidential power to protect
national security. District Judge Damon Keith ruled36 that the surveillance violated the fourth amendment and that records of the
wiretaps therefore had to be disclosed to Plamondon under the rule
of Alderman v. United States. 31 Both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court order. 38
32. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 25II(3), 82 Stat. 214 (1968) (previously codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 25ll(3) (1976)), provided:

Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934 (48 Stat. ll43 [sic, probably meant to be ll03]; 47 U.S.C. § 605) shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign
power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the
United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or
against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by the authority of the
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise
used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
33. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1972). See also 114
CONG. REC. 14751 (1968), reprinted in 407 U.S. at 306-07.
34. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
35. 407 U.S. at 308-09, 321-22 (1972). The defendants were members of an organization
that had no foreign ties. 407 U.S. at 300 n.2.
36. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1079-80 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
37. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Alderman concerned procedures for determining whether evidence offered in a criminal trial is tainted by illegal surveillance. A divided Court held that
records of conversations illegally overheard, even in cases of national security surveillance,
must be disclosed to the defendant. The Court did not decide, however, whether warrantless
national security wiretapping was in fact unlawful. See Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S.
310, 314-15 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
38. United States v. United States District Court, 444 F.2d 651, 664-69 (6th Cir. 1971),
qffd., 407 U.S. 297, 321-24 (1972).
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Although the Supreme Court limited its inquiry to the issue of
whether warrants are required prior to surveillance in domestic security cases (ie., in cases where threats to national security originate
from American citizens or groups), United States IJistrict Court established a balancing approach that applies to foreign security surveillance as well. The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress, in
enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act, intended to leave the President's power undisturbed and the
question of the warrant requirement for national security wiretaps
unanswered. 39 Since Title III failed to determine the wiretap's legality,40 the Court turned to the fourth amendment standard of "reasonableness."41 According to the Court, this standard requires a
balancing approach:42 the Government's interest in protecting the
domestic security, especially the President's duty to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,"43 must be weighed against the citizen's first and fourth amendment interests in privacy and free expression.44
39. 407 U.S. at 306-07.
40. Justice White felt that the Plamondon surveillance did not fall within the § 2511(3)
disclaimer. 407 U.S. at 341 (White, J., concurring). White also believed that the Attorney
General's affidavit did not suggest that the surveillance was necessary to prevent overthrow of
the Government by force or other unlawful means or to protect against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. 407 U.S. at 341. White argued
that, absent the grave threat required by the plain words of§ 2511(3), the disclaimer did not
apply and the general warrant requirements of Title III had to be met. On these statutory
grounds, Justice White concurred in the court's judgment without reaching the constitutional
issue. 407 U.S. at 335-44.
Justice White's concurring opinion in United States .District Court is an interesting contrast
to his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362-64 (1967). In Katz,
Justice White claimed that the President had the inherent power to authorize warrantless wiretaps in "national security cases," 389 U.S. at 363; White did not distinguish the domestic and
foreign aspects of national security. Justice White's statutory reasoning in United States .District Court therefore implies either a change of view since Katz or a view that Congress could
limit the President's inherent power. The latter seems to be the case:
Thus, even assuming the constitutionality of a warrantless surveillance authorized by the
President to uncover private or official graft forbidden by federal statute, the interception
would be illegal under§ 2511(1) because it is not the type of presidential action saved by
the Act by the provision of§ 2511(3).... [T]he United States does not claim that Congress is powerless to require warrants for surveillances that the President otherwise would
not be barred by the Fourth Amendment from undertaking without a warrant.
407 U.S. at 338 n.2 (White, J., concurring); compare text at notes 118-41 infra.
41. 407 U.S. at 308-10. The Court cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
for the proposition that the standard for a search's reasonableness is derived from the Warrant
Clause. 407 U.S. at 309-10. According to the Court, the relevant test is not whether the search
is reasonable, but whether it is reasonable to require the procurement of a search warrant. 407
U.S. at 315.
42. 407 U.S. at 314.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
44. If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic security requires the use
of electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free
expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is
undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the
efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed
against it.
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The Court held that despite the President's constitutional mandate "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States,"45 the fourth amendment reasonableness standard requires
prior judicial approval of electronic surveillance in domestic security
cases. 46 Additionally, the Court ruled that Congress had authority to
legislate warrant procedures for the executive and judiciary to follow, at least in domestic security cases.47
The relevance of United States .District Court to foreign security
cases (ie., cases where threats to national security originate from foreign powers or their agents) is two-fold. First, the decision indicates
that neither the interest in national security nor the interest in individual privacy48 is a constitutional absolute, and that the two must
therefore be balanced in deciding the question of a national security
exemption from judicial approval of electronic surveillance. Second,
the case establishes that when prior judicial approval of surveillance
is constitutionally required (when fourth amendment interests prevail) or constitutionally permissible (when executive functions would
not be unduly frustrated), Congress may prescribe "reasonable standards" for the warrant procedure.49 Unless a qualitative constitutional difference between domestic and foreign security cases can be
established, Congress therefore may legislate appropriate standards
governing executive conduct and judicial approval of foreign security surveillance. so
Three circuit courts have struggled with the issue left unresolved
by United States .District Court: Does the President's power to con407 U.S. at 315. It is notable that the Court relied in part on citizens' first amendment interests
of free speech and association as they overlap with fourth amendment privacy; this overlap is
equally relevant to foreign affairs. See Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976, 987-88 (1974).
45. 407 U.S. at 310.
46. 407 U.S. at 314-21, 323-24.
The Government made four arguments: (1) that the warrant requirement would hinder
preservation of domestic security; (2) that courts might make errors; (3) that breaches of security might occur; and (4) that domestic security surveillance should be included in the administrative search exemption (in existence between the decisions in Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); see
generally Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV, 1291 (1979)) since
such surveillance was primarily for the purpose of obtaining information and not for criminal
prosecutions. 407 U.S. at 318-19. The Court found these arguments unpersuasive. 407 U.S. at
319-21.
47. 407 U.S. at 322-24. See Nessen, Aspects ofthe Executive's Power over National Security
Mallers: Secrecy Classifications and Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L.J. 399, 411-13
(1974).
48. The Court here refers to privacy in the context of the fourth amendment, not in terms
of a fundamental "right of privacy," see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v,
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. 407 U.S. at 322-24. See note 40 supra-, Nessen, supra note 47, at 411-21.
50. See text at notes 107-17 inji-a for an analysis of constitutional distinctions between
domestic and foreign affairs.
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duct foreign affairs allow him to approve warrantless electronic surveillance for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence?51
In United States v. Brown, 52 the Fifth Circuit, relying on its preUnited States .District Court holding in United States v. C!ay, 53 concluded that the President has authority "over and above the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment" to order foreign security surveillance.54 In Brown, warrantless wiretaps of an undisclosed party had
intercepted conversations with black activist H. Rap Brown. After
examining the wiretap records in camera, the district court judge
concluded that they contained nothing relevant to Brown's case and
that they were legal wiretaps made for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. 55 On appeal, Brown contended that the wiretaps
were illegal and that in camera review was therefore insufficient under Alderman v. United States. 56 The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded. It affirmed the district court on the basis of the President's
"inherent power to protect national security in the context of foreign
affairs." 57
51. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov
v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
The Ninth Circuit su=arily adopted the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits in a
case challenging the nondisclosure of foreign security surveillance records under the Alderman
rule. See note 37 supra. The Ninth Circuit made no mention of the D.C. Circuit's opinion.
United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977) ("Foreign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general warrant requirement and disclosure of wiretaps not involving illegal surveillance is within the trial court's discretion").
52. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) (Griffin Bell, J.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
53. 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), revd. on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
54. 484 F.2d at 426.
55. United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531, 537 (E.D. La. 1970). On appeal the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that Brown's involvement in the surveillance was "happenstance at most."
484 F.2d at 425.
United States v. Clay also involved the criminal prosecution of a defendant whose conversations the government had incidentally overheard in the warrantless surveillance of a party
not involved in the proceedings. The district court judge concluded after in camera review of
the wiretap that the records were irrelevant to the criminal case and denied disclosure. 430
F.2d at 166-67.
56. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). See note 37 supra.
57. 484 F.2d at 426. Clay and Brown do not persuasively resolve the constitutional issue,
however, because the Fifth Circuit's balancing test in both cases differs in two important respects from the Supreme Court's weighing of interests in United States District Court. First, in
Clay the Fifth Circuit "balance[d] the right of the defendant and the national interest." 430
F.2d at 171 (emphasis added). This particularized balancing, considering only the individual
defendant before the court (who may not have been the surveillance target), contrasts with
United States .District Court, where the Supreme Court balanced the national security interest
with "the needs of citizens [in general] for privacy and free expression." 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1972). Second, in evaluating the surveillance of an individual defendant, the Fifth Circuit
prescribed an ex post test of whether a particular search and seizure was reasonable, rather
than an ex ante test of whether it was reasonable to require the procurement of a warrant for
the search. Compare note 41 supra, and cases cited therein. The Supreme Court rejected this
approach for domestic security surveillance in United States .District Court: ''The Fourth
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The Third Circuit reached a similar result in United States v.
Butenko.58 In Butenko, the court assessed the legality of a wiretap of
the defendant's conversations with a Soviet citizen working at the
Soviet mission to the United Nations. The Soviet employee was suspected of espionage. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's
claims under section 605 of the Communications Act of 193459 and
thus reached the constitutional issue. Emphasizing a strong public
interest in a judicially unimpaired fl.ow of foreign policy information, the Third Circuit held that the surveillance was constitutional
because it fell within a foreign intelligence gathering exception to the
warrant requirement. 60 The court implied, however, that this exception might apply only to surveillance of individuals with direct ties to
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may
be reasonably exercised." 407 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted).
58. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (5-4 decision), cerl. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United
States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). Bulenko was criticized severely in Comment, supra note 10.
59. 494 F.2d at 598-602. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. Section 605 was arguably applicable since the surveillance preceded the 1968 adoption of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act and its § 2511(3) disclaimer. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
60. 494 F.2d at 605. The Bulenko majority purported to balance two constitutional interests: "the federal government's need to accumulate information concerning activities within
the United States of foreign powers and the people's right of privacy as embodied in statute
and the Fourth Amendment." 494 F.2d at 596. Nevertheless, the majority opinion's tenor and
approach leave little doubt that the majority considered the security interest far more important. The majority even suggested that, were it not for United Stoles IJistrict Court, it might
have held that the President could "act unencumbered by the Fourth Amendment requirements of prior judicial approval and probable cause when he is dealing with national security
matters." 494 F.2d at 602. Instead, the majority characterized the Government's interest as
"surely weighty" - only a little less than absolute. 494 F.2d at 606. The majority thus contrasted the President's near absolute foreign affairs powers with the more limited scope of the
fourth amendment. To demonstrate the fourth amendment's limitations, the majority pointed
to four exceptions to the general requirement of judicial approval: an automobile search to
prevent the transfer of contraband, a police officer's search incidental to a probable cause
arrest, a police officer's frisk of a detained person believed to be armed and dangerous, and a
"home visit" by a welfare worker. 494 F.2d at 604-05. Then, ignoring the first three exceptions, the majority read the "home visit" exception expansively to create a "public interest"
exception to the fourth amendment, an exception that included "the efficient operation of the
Executive's foreign policy-making apparatus." 494 F.2d at 605. A warrant requirement for
foreign security surveillances, the majority believed, ''would seriously fetter the Executive in
the performance of his foreign affairs duties" by requiring officers to "interrupt their activities
and rush to the nearest available magistrate." 494 F.2d at 605.
The majority carried these arguments beyond their logical limits. First, the believable assumption that requiring prior judicial approval would be undesirable in some exigent circumstances does not justify an exception from judicial approval in all foreign security
surveillances. Second, and more importantly, to imply that the warrant requirement may be
avoided whenever a public interest to do so exists makes the warrant requirement a constitutional nullity. The framers added the fourth amendment to the Constitution because they
perceived a strong public interest in the warrant requirement. Constitutional values do not
become irrelevant whenever they cause inconvenience and inefficiency. See, e.g., United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 321 ("Although some added burden will be
imposed upon the Attorney General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society to protect
constitutional values"); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissent•
ing).
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foreign governments.61
In Zweibon v. Mitchell, 62 the District of Columbia Circuit became the third federal appellate court to address the scope of the
President's foreign intelligence gathering power. Zweibon involved a
civil suit63 against Attorney General John Mitchell and FBI special
agents for damages resulting from electronic surveillance of the Jewish Defense League's New York headquarters.64 The defendants admitted that they had conducted the surveillance, but they asserted
that it was authorized by "the President's ability and constitutional
authority to conduct the foreign relations of this country."65 It is
difficult to infer a clear holding from Zweibon because of the length
and number of the opinions (the eight circuit judges filed five separate opinions) and the interrelated issues of statutory and constitutional violations and remedies. _Nevertheless, the plurality opinion66
appears to state that, absent exigent circumstances, the President
must obtain a warrant for all national security surveillances, domestic and foreign, conducted within the United States. 67 While the
three judges who signed the plurality opinion followed the spirit of
the United States District Court balancing test, 68 they recognized that
their conclusion was largely dictum:
[W]e need not rest our decision on so broad a holding, since we are
61. The court indicated that surveillance of international grain dealers or oil companies to
obtain economic information relevant to U.S. foreign policy would probably be subject to the
fourth amendment restrictions described in United Stales JJistricl Court. See 494 F.2d at 603
n.39.
62. Zweibon v. Mitchell (Zweibon I), 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976). Zweibon IIis In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam),
which required a jury trial of the "good faith" affirmative defense. Zweibon III, Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. appliedfor, Nos. 79-881, 79-883 (Dec. 7, 1979),
reversed the district court for the third time. The D.C. Circuit held that the warrant requirements of United States District Court and Zweibon I apply retroactively and that compensation
may be sought under the Bivens doctrine, see note 63 i,!fra, but not under Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, see text at notes 28-30 supra. This
holding partially reversed Zweibon I, and was first advocated in Case Comment, supra note
31, at 792-801. For a comprehensive discussion of Zweibon I, see Note, The Fourth Amendment and Judicial Review of Foreign Intelligence Wiretapping-. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 45 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 55 (1976); Case Comment, supra note 31.
63. See Bivens v. Six Un.known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal cause
of action exists to remedy violations of the fourth amendment).
64. Jewish Defense League members had taken part in activities directed against Soviet
officials and installations in the United States ranging from peaceful demonstrations to acts of
violence, including bombings. Soviet officials made repeated and vigorous protests to the
United States government; they threatened a chilling of international relations and retaliation
against American citizens living in Moscow. Fearing these international consequences and
hoping to prevent further criminal acts by the JDL, the Attorney General approved a warrant•
less wiretap. 516 F.2d at 608-1 l.
65. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936, 942 (D.D.C. 1973).
66. Circuit Judges Wright, Leventhal, and Robinson and Chief Judge Bazelon joined in
the opinion (Chief Judge Bazelon dissented in part).
67. 516 F.2d at 651.
68. 516 F.2d at 628-51.
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only presented with a case in which foreign thteats of retaliation
against individual citizens abroad were provoked by the actions of the
domestic organization which was subsequently wiretapped, rather than
a case in which the wiretapped organization acted in collaboration
with, or as the agent of, the foreign power from which the threat emanated. 69

The remaining four judges also recognized that the plurality's broad
holding was unnecessary: two declined comment on the foreign security exception to the warrant requirement, and two others con. eluded the plurality's holding was incorrect.70 Although it purported
to resolve the issue of foreign intelligence surveillance, the D.C. Circuit's decision left things even more uncertain than United States
.District Court.11 As in United States .District Court, the court seemingly invited Congress to delineate the appropriate procedures (and
perhaps the substantive law as well) which the decision failed to establish. 72
The Brown, Butenko, and Zweibon cases illustrate the legal confusion existing at the time Congress attempted to reconcile foreign
intelligence gathering with individual liberty by enacting the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. 73 This Note does not seek to resolve
69. 516 F.2d at 651.
70. Judge Robb believed the case was controlled by the domestic security requirements of
United States .District Court; he therefore declined comment on the claimed foreign security
warrant exception. 516 F.2d at 688 (Robb, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Jewish De•
fense League is a domestic organization"). Judge McGowan argued that Title III of the Omni•
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 controlled the case. He also refused to address
the issue left unresolved in United States .District Court. 516 F.2d at 681, 683-87 (McGowan,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("Judge Wright's discussion of the general problem of whether
there should be a foreign security exception to the constitutional warrant requirement, though
a scholarly effort of extraordinary proportions, seems to me unnecessary").
Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon concurred in the plurality's finding that the wiretaps were
pursuant to the President's foreign affairs powers, and also in the holding that the warrantless
surveillance was nevertheless a violation of the fourth amendment. 516 F.2d at 689, 706
(Wilkey and MacKinnon, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Neither, however,
accepted the broad dictum of the plurality that all foreign intelligence surveillances required
judicial warrants. They suggested (equally in dictum) that warrantless surveillances of foreign
agents and collaborators - as distinguished from individuals or domestic organizations antag•
onistic to foreign powers - would be constitutional. 516 F.2d at 705, 706.
71. Compare 516 F.2d 594, 658-59 with 407 U.S. 297, 322-23.
72. See 516 F.2d at 658-59.
73. This issue has arisen in several other cases. The Ninth Circuit endorsed the holdings of
the Third and Fifth Circuits in Butenko and Brown without discussion in United States v.
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977). See note 51 supra.
The Fourth Circuit, in a case decided after the FISA's passage but arising from events that
took place before the Act took effect, also declared a warrant unnecessary for electronic sur•
veillance when the "primary purpose" of the surveillance is to gather or protect foreign intelli•
gence information. United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978), ajfd. sub
nom. United States v. Truong, No. 78-5176 (4th Cir. July 17, 1980). See also Jabara v. Kelley,
476 F. Supp. 561,576 (E.D. Mich. 1979); United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal.
1971). On the other hand, the District of Columbia District Court accepted and expanded the
holding of Zweibon I in Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 159 (D,D.C.
1976) ("[A]bsent exigent circumstances, prior judicial authorization in the form of a warrant
based on probable cause is required for electronic surveillance by the Army of American citi-
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whether, in the absence of legislation, the President possesses constitutional power to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance.74 That task has been attempted elsewhere.75 Nor is it
necessary to resolve that problem. If Butenko is correct and the
President has extensive surveillance power in the absence of legislation, the relevant issue is whether he retains that power after passage
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. On the other hand, if
the Zweibon plurality is correct and no foreign intelligence warrant
exception exists, the question remains whether the specific requirements and procedures of the Act unconstitutionally restrain presidential power. Both questions involve issues of congressional
authority to enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and of
judicial ability to carry out its requirements. To resolve these underlying issues, it will first be necessary to describe the standards and
procedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in greater
detail.
II.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act employs detailed warrant application and authorization procedures to prevent indiscriminate use of electronic surveillance.76 The Act calls upon the Chief
zens or organizations located overseas when there is no evidence of collaboration with or action on behalf of a foreign power"). The Second Circuit successfully avoided the issue in
United States v. Ajlouny, No. 80-1047 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 1980).
74. See text at notes 34-51 supra.
75. See, e.g., Lacovara, supra note 10; Nesson, supra note 47; Case Co=ent, supra note
31; Note, supra note ll; Note, supra note 62; Note, supra note 44; Co=ent, supra note 10;
Note, supra note 10; Note, Government Monitoring ofInternational Electronic Communications:
National Security Agency Watch List Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 429 (1978); Note, The Fourth Amendment and Executive Authorization of Warran/less Foreign Security Surveillance, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 397 (1978).
76. Section 101(1) of the FISA defines electronic surveillances as consisting of four partially overlapping categories:
(I) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required
for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the
consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the
United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in
the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
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Justice to designate seven district court judges to serve overlapping
terms on a special court that hears warrant requests. 77 The Chief
Justice also designates three. federal judges to form a special court
with jurisdiction to review the denial of warrant applications.78 If
See generally Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH, L.
REv. 154 (1977) (discussing the "reasonable expectation of privacy").
This definition does not encompass all that is commonly considered electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) is capa•
ble of intercepting all electronic communications to and from the United States. The NSA can
sort out these communications and identify communications to, from, or about any specific
targeted individual or about any specified subject matter. E.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 11,
12 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), denying rehearing en bane of Halkin v.
Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL Qp.
ERATIONS WITH REsPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BOOK Ill: FOREION
AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,
REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 739-40 (1976). Apparently, the FISA gives the NSA complete discretion to monitor any and all international radio
communications (including all international telephone conversations transmitted by satellite);
interception of communications to or from untargeted individuals (for example, communications that the NSA distinguishes on the basis of subject matter) is not electronic surveillance
under the Act's definitions. See FISA § I0I(f). Some of the NSA's activities are therefore
unaffected by the Act's standards and procedures. FISA § IOI(f); see Note, Government
Monitoring of International Electronic Communications: National Security Agency Watch Lisi
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 75, at 461 n.244. In addition, the section of
the Act that calls for the destruction of information from "unintentional" acquisition of radio
communications applies only "if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within
the United States," thereby exempting some of NSA's activities from its strictures. See also
note 89 and accompanying text infta.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a Government claim of
"state secrets" privilege, effectively dismissing a suit claiming infringement of fourth amendment rights by the NSA. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane
denied, 598 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court did not consider the impact of the FISA on
the plaintiJfs claims since the suit had been filed before the Act's passage. Halkins v. Helms,
598 F.2d at 18 n.32 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
77. FISA, § 103(a),(d). Chief Justice Burger-made the first appointments on May 18, 1979.
The first appointees to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court were: Judge Albert V.
Bryan, Jr. (E.D. Va.), seven-year term; Judge Frederick B. Lacey (D.N.J.), six-year term;
Judge Lawrence Warren Pierce (S.D.N.Y.), five-year term; Judge Frank J. McGarr (N.D. Ill.),
four-year term; Judge George L. Hart, Jr. (D.D.C.), three-year term; Judge James H. Meridith
(E.D. Mo.), two-year term; and Judge Thomas Jamison MacBride (E.D. Cal), one-year term.
Appointments Announced: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts, 11 THE THIRD BRANCH,
No. 5, May 1979, at 7.
The conference report indicates that these judges will serve on rotation in the District of
Columbia with at least two on duty at any given time. H.R. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 26-27, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4048, 4055-56. The court has
nationwide jurisdiction and is placed in one location to minimize security risks. 124 CoNo.
REc. Hl2,538-39 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Murphy of Illinois). In Senate
hearings, Attorney General Bell expressed his faith that the judiciary is not a security risk,
calling the judiciary ''the most leakproof branch of the Government." Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 1566].
78. FISA § 103(b). The first appointees to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review were: Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. (3d Cir.), seven-year term; Judge James E.
Barrett (10th Cir.), five-year term; Judge George Edward MacKinnon (D.C. Cir.), three-year
term. Appointments Announced· Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts, 11 THE THIRD
BRANCH, No. 5, May 1979, at 7.
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this special appellate court denies a warrant, the Government may
petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
The Act's warrant application and authorization procedures require executive branch officials to state in writing the circumstances
justifying each warrant. They require the judge hearing the application to state in writing the reasons for granting or denying each request. 79 Before issuing an order approving surveillance, the judge
must conduct an ex parte proceeding to ensure that the application
has the approval of the attorney general, 80 that it contains all the
necessary statements and certifications, 81 and, most importantly, that
there exists "probable cause to believe that - (A) the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power
. . . ; and (B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 82
79. In general, a warrant application for foreign intelligence surveillance requires the following:
(I) the approval of the Attorney General based upon his finding that the application satisfies the statutory criteria, FISA § 104(a);
(2) the identity of the federal officer requesting the warrant, FISA § 104(a)(l);
(3) the identity of the target, if known, or a description of the target, FISA § 104(a)(3);
(4) a statement of the facts and circumstances used to justify the belief that the target is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the premises targeted are used by a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, FISA § 104(a)(4);
(5) a statement of the proposed "minimization procedures," FISA § 104(a)(5) (''Minimization procedures" defined in section IOI(h), are means of limiting the acquisition, retention, and
dissemination of information obtained from electronic surveillance which does not relate to
the proper objects of the surveillance. Compare FISA §§ I0I(h), 106, with Berger v. United
States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see generally Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (Title III
minimization procedures), and Fishman, The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title III, the Fourth Amendment, and the IJreadScott Decision, 8 AM. U. L. REv. 315
(1979));
(6) a description of the information sought and the type of co=unications to be targeted,
FISA § 104(a)(6);
(7) a certification by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or by
another officer designated by the President from among those executive officers with duties in
the area of national security of defense who are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, that: (a) the information sought is foreign intelligence information, (b)
the purpose of the proposed surveillance is to obtain that information, and (c) the information
cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques, FISA § 104(a)(7); see Exec.
Order No. 12,139, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,311 (May 23, 1979);
(8) a statement of the method of surveillance and whether physical entry is required, FISA
§ 104(a)(8), see note 86 infra;
(9) a statement of the facts relating to previous warrant applications for surveillance directed at the same target, FISA § 104(a)(9); and
(10) a statement of the time period for which surveillance is requested, FISA § 104(a)(IO).
80. FISA § 105(a)(l), (2).
81. FISA § 105(a)(5).
82. FISA § 105(a)(3). By requiring a showing of probable cause to believe that a targeted
individual is an agent of a foreign power, the Act effectively requires probable cause to believe
that a criminal law has been or is about to be violated before a United States person may be
placed under surveillance. See note 83 infra; FISA § IOI(b) (defining "agent of a foreign
power"). Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (requiring a nexus between the
object of search and seizure and the alleged criminal behavior).
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Even higher standards of review are imposed if the target of the
requested surveillance is a "United States person": 83 the judge must
83. Under the Act "United States person" includes United States citizens, permanent resident alie~, and groups whose membership includes a "substantial number'' of United States
citizens and permanent resident aliens. FISA § IOI(i). The Act provides that any person,
other than a United States person, who "acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a
foreign power" or as a member of an international terrorist group, or who is believed to engage
in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States on behalf of a foreign power may be
treated as an "agent of a foreign power." FISA § IOI(b)(l). In addition, a United States
person who knowingly aids, abets, engages in, or conspires to engage in clandestine intelligence activities, international terrorism, or sabotage on behalf of a foreign power also qualifies
as an agent of a foreign power, but only when his or her activities involve or may involve the
violation of a criminal statute. FISA § 10l(b)(2). Among the federal criminal statutes most
likely to be involved are assault on a foreign official, 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1976); bribery of public
officials, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976); United States officer or employee acting as agent of foreign
principal, 18 U.S.C. § 219 (1976); civil disorder, 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1976); congressional assassination, kidnapping, and assault, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1976); falsification of military, naval, or official passes, 18 U.S.C. § 499 (1976); escape ofprisioners of war or enemy aliens, 18 U.S.C, § 757
(1976); gathering, transmitting or losing defense information, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1976); gathering
or delivering defense information to aid foreign government, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1976); other acts
of espionage or disclosure of classified information, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792, 795-799 (1976); extortion
and threats, 18 U.S.C. §§ 871-73, 876-78 (1976); interstate transportation of firearms, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 (1976); various interferences with foreign governments or foreign affairs, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 951-970 (1976); destruction of government communications lines, 18 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976);
piracy, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1661 (1976); presidential assassination, kidnapping and assault, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1751-52 (1976); disclosure of confidential information, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976); concealment, removal, or mutilation of public records, 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976); sabotage, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2151-2157 (1976); treason, sedition, and subversive activities, 18 U.S.C. §§ 23812391 (1976); illegal exportation of war materials, 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); and offenses against
neutrality, 22 U.S.C. §§ 461-465 (1976). The Act defines international terrorism as "activites
[involving] violent acts or acts dangerous to human life" that violate the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or would violate a criminal law if committed within the proper
jurisdiction, and that appear to be intended to coerce a civilian population or influence government policy. FISA § IOI(c).
As a result of these definitions, foreign embassy officers and employees, but not United
States citizens, may be subject to surveillance without any prior indication of potential criminal conduct. The statute provides that no United States person may be considered an agent of
a foreign power solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment. FISA
§ I05(a)(3)(A).
An agent of a foreign power, or a foreign power itself, may also be the subject of electronic
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information. FISA § 102(b), The FISA defines foreign intelligence information as:
(I) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to,
the ability of the United States to protect against (A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a for•
eign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if
concerning a United States person is necessary to (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of foreign affairs of the United States.
FISA § IOI(e). The Act therefore provides a stricter standard for the surveillance of United
States persons than for the surveillance of foreign nationals. Note, however, that if the FISA
affords less protection to foreign nationals than the fourth amendment, the government must
comply with the stricter fourth amendment standard. The ''people" protected by the fourth
amendment are all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (alien may assert exclusion-
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find that the certifications of the executive officer are not clearly erroneous. The judge must base this finding on the statements made
by the executive officer to support the certifications and on any other
information the judge believes is necessary. 84 If these requirements
are satisfied, an order approving the surveillance for a limited period85 will issue.86
The FISA waives the warrant requirement in three situations. 87
First, the Attorney General may unilaterally authorize electronic
surveillance in emergencies if judicial proceedings would unacceptably delay surveillance. 88 Second, federal officials need not obtain a
warrant to intercept communications "exclusively between or among
foreign powers" or to acquire "technical intelligence, other than the
spoken communications of individuals, from property or premises
under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power . . . ."89
I

ary rule in deportation proceeding); cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (Court
assumed that aliens, even those who had entered the country illegally and were engaged in
espionage, were entitled to full fourth amendment protection; search made incidental to valid
deportation arrest; conviction affirmed). This Note does not consider whether the statute's
standards for foreign nationals meet fourth amendment requirements. Nevertheless, the
reader should be aware that the Act d9es not require a showing of probable cause to suspect
criminal activity before surveillance of foreign nationals may commence. See FISA
§§ I0I(b)(l), 105(a)(3), and note 82 supra.
84. FISA § 105(a)(5). The statements of the executive officer must support the conclusions
that "(i) the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information designated; and
(ii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques."
FISA § 104(a)(7)(E). The judge may require other necessary information for his or her determinations. FISA § 104(d). In Senate hearings Defense Secretary Harold Brown expressed a
concern that the word "necessary" in section 104(d) - which allows the judge to require the
government to furnish additional information to support its application - might be interpreted to mean "substantially more than just 'useful' or 'helpful.'" Hearings on S. 1566, supra
note 77, at 55. The legislative history neither confirms nor denies this possible interpretation.
Congress may have chosen the "clearly erroneous" standard over a "probable cause" standard for these factual findings in deference to executive claims of expertise in "highly sophisticated matters of national defense, foreign affairs, and counterintelligence." Id. at 15
(statement of Attorney General Bell).
85. Judicial orders may approve surveillance of individuals for up to 90 days; surveillance
of foreign powers may be approved for up to one year. FISA § 105(d)(l ). Extensions of current warrants "may be granted on the same basis as an original order upon application for an
extension and new findings" for similarly limited periods of time. FISA § 105(d)(2), (3).
86. FISA § l0S(a). The order approving an electronic surveillance must explicitly specify
whether physical entry will be used to effect the surveillance. FISA § 105(b)(l)(D). This explicit approval of physical entry is not required by the fourth amendment, nor is it necessary
under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1976). Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255-59 (1979).
87. In addition to these three exceptions, FISA § 105(f) allows non-targeted surveillance
for equipment tests and personnel training when no alternative means of testing or training
exists, provided that no information so obtained is retained or disclosed.
88. FISA § 105(e). This section also provides that the Attorney General or his designee
must file a warrant application with a judge within twenty-four hours of such an emergency
authorization. If the application is denied, the surveillance must be terminated and any collected information may not be disclosed.
89. FISA § 102(a)(l)(A). The Attorney General must certify that there is no substantial
likelihood that a United States person would be a party to any acquired communications. A
certification of the surveillance is filed with the statutory court, under seal to protect the se-
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Third, the warrant requirement is waived during the first fifteen days
following a congressional declaration of war. 90 This exemption allows Congress time to consider any amendments to the Act that
"may be appropriate during a wartime emergency." 91
In passing the FISA, Congress rejected any claim of inherent
presidential power to conduct foreign security surveillance. 92 Although the majority of the House-Senate Conference Committee believed that the President possesses no inherent power to conduct
wiretapping or electronic surveillance without court approval, it left
the issue for final resolution by the Supreme Court:
The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of exclusive
means by which the President may conduct electronic surveillance
does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court. The intent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case: "When a President
takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at the lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own Constitutional power minus any Constitutional power of Concrecy of the surveillance. FISA § 102(a)(3). No judicial approval of this specialized surveil•
lance is required, and the certification remains sealed, unless: (I) a district court must
determine the legality of the surveillance, FISA § 102(a)(3)(B) (a district court must consider
in camera the application's validity if a party seeks to introduce surveillance information as
evidence in a trial, hearing, or other court proceeding, FISA § 106(c), (d), and (f), or if any
aggrieved person moves to suppress evidence obtained or derived from such surveillance,
FISA § 106(e), (f)); or (2) the surveillance picks up the communications of United States persons, FISA §§ IOI(h)(4), 102(a)(3)(A). In the latter case, the information may not be used for
any purpose and must be destroyed within the twenty-four hours unless court approval of the
original surveillance is obtained. FISA § 10l(h)(4).
The advanced electronic surveillance permitted by§ 102(a)(I)(A) is carried on exclusively
by the Nation?l Security Agency (NSA); the exemption is therefore referred to as the NSA
exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 7, at 24, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CODE CONG,
& Ao. NEWS 4048, 4053; Berlow, supra note 7, at 2964-65.
90. FISA § 111.
91. H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 7, at 34, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 4048, 4063.
92. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 77, at 2, 14-15 (statements of Senator Ken•
nedy and Attorney General Bell).
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 explicitly disclaimed
any intent to affect the President's power in national security surveillance. See Omnibus
Crime Control jmd Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511(3), 82 Stat. 214 (previously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976)). The FISA repealed this disclaimer contained in
Title III and aniended the Safe Streets Act to provide in part:
[T]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire and oral communications (to obtain foreign intelligence information] may be conducted.
FISA § 201. The House version had designated the bill as "the exclusive statutory means" of
foreign intelligence surveillance. H.R. 7308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(b)(f), 124 CONG, REC,
H9273 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (emphasis added). The word "statutory" was then deleted in
conference. H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 7, at 35, reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE CONG, &
Ao. NEWS 4048, 4064. Despite a vigorous argument of unconstitutionality, led by Representative McClory of Illinois, see Dissenting Views, supra note 9, at HI 1,683-85; 124 CONG. REC,
Hl2,535-37, H12,540-42 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978), the Senate adopted the conference substitute
by a voice vote, 124 CONG. REC. S17,884 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978), and the House of Representatives by a vote of226 to 176, 124 CoNG. REc. Hl2,542-43 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978).
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gress over the matter." Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637 (1952).93

The remainder of this Note assesses whether Congress found a constitutional means to legislate a judicial role in foreign security surveillance.
Ill.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

SURVEILLANCE ACT

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act raises difficult separation of powers issues. The Act is vulnerable to constitutional challenge as an intrusion by both Congress and the judiciary into the
President's power to conduct foreign affairs. Two challenges to the
Act's constitutionality seem particularly troublesome. First, the Act
may exceed congressional po~er to interfere with inherent and exclusive presidential powers. 94 Second, the Act may require the judiciary to review presidential foreign policy decisions - a task beyond
judicial competence.95
Before a court can review either of these challenges to the Act's
constitutionality, it must decide that it has the power to do so. The
recent case of Goldwater v. Carter96 may indicate that federal courts
would not assert that power. In Goldwater, the Supreme Court dismissed a Senator's complaint that President Carter lacked the constitutional power to abrogate a mutual defense treaty between the
United States and Taiwan without Senate approval. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Goldwater suggests a sweeping application of the political question doctrine to all foreign affairs
controversies. Justice Rehnquist began his opinion:
I am of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners
in this case is "political" and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's
foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is
authorized to negate the action of the President.97

Justice Rehnquist did not declare whether his opinion was meant
to overrule Justice Brennan's dictum in Baker v. Carr that "not every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 98 That possibility, however, seems unlikely and
untenable. Justice Rehnquist's political question dismissal relied essentially on two grounds: the Constitution's silence on treaty termi93. H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 1, at 35 (footnote omitted), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
& AD. NEWS 4048, 4064.
94. See, e.g., Dissenting Views, supra note 9, at Hll,683-84.
95. See, e.g., Hearings on R.R. 7308 Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1978) (statement of Laurence H. Silberman).
96. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
97. 444 U.S. at 1002 (plurality opinion).
98. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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nation99 and the resources available to coequal branches to settle
their disputes politically. 100 But these grounds are open to serious
dispute. Justice Powell correctly pointed out that interstitial analysis
is as much the Court's duty as textual analysis; neither inquiry necessarily demands "special competence or information beyond the
reach of the Judiciary." 101 Justice Powell also cited the "Court's
willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one branch of
our government has impinged upon the power of another." 102
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist's expansive interpretation of the political question doctrine has never been endorsed by a majority of
the Supreme Court. 103 Even if a majority of the Court eventually
embraces the plurality opinion in Goldwater, it is unlikely that the
political question doctrine would be expanded to reach all foreign
affairs questions. Professor Henkin's observation that "[t]he
Supreme Court has never invoked the political question doctrine to
dismiss an individual's claim that a foreign relations action deprived
him of constitutional rights" 104 remains true. Since the PISA attempts to strike a balance that protects both national security and
individual rights, its constitutionality falls within the category of
questions which Henkin correctly identifies as non-political. The
Court should not leave individual rights to the unlimited discretion
of the political branches merely because the political action is
clothed in the garb of foreign affairs. 105 It therefore seems reason99. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist thought
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 443 (1939), was "directly analogous." Coleman asked whether a
state could ratify a constitutional amendment that it had previously rejected. Chief Justice
Hughes pointed to the Constitution's silence on the rejection of proposed constitutional
amendments in declaring the issue a political question, 307 U.S. at 450 (plurality opinion);
Justice Rehnquist pointed to the Constitution's silence on treaty abrogation, 444 U.S. at 1003
(plurality opinion).
100. 444 U.S. at 1004 (plurality opinion). Professor Henkin, several years before Goldwater
v. Carter, argued that Congress and the President could not sue each other for alleged consti•
tutional deficiencies. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 208 (1972).
IOI. 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell offered a hypothetical case:
"Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign country and announced that it would go into effect despite its rejection by the Senate." According to Justice
Powell, Justice Rehnquist's analysis would classify this dispute a political question, even
though Powell believed the hypothetical dispute would be clearly justiciable and, except for
being an easier case on the merits, indistinguishable for political question purposes from the
controversy before the Court. 444 U.S. at 999-1000.
102. 444 U.S. at 1001 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. I, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case,
279 U.S. 655, 676-78 (1929); and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), as examples.
103. The doctrine was explicitly rejected by Justice Powell, 444 U.S. at 998, and by Justice
Brennan, 444 U.S. at 1006-07. (Justice Brennan authored the Supreme Court's decision in
Balcer v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Justices Blackmun, White, and Marshall expressed no
opinion on the justiciability issue. 444 U.S. at 996, 1006.
104. L. HENKIN, supra note 100,.at 485 n.6.
105. q. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1145 (D.D.C. 1979) (selective deportation
program for Iranian, students violated equal protection), revd., 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980).
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able for the federal courts, if called upon, to review the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
A.

Congressional Power to Regulate Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Within the United States

The President has the constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs.106 During debate in the House of Representatives, several
Congressmen vigorously argued that the FISA would improperly
limit that power. Their argument rested on two contentions: first,
that foreign-intelligence gathering within the United States is part of
the conduct of foreign affairs; and second, that the FISA exceeds the
scope of congressional power to regulate the conduct of foreign affairs. Careful analysis reveals that while the first contention may be
true, the second is incorrect.
The conduct of foreign intelligence surveillance within the
United States may fall within either the domestic or the foreign affairs powers of the President. If this surveillance is a domestic affair,
Congress has plenary power to regulate it. 107 On the other hand, if
this surveillance is a foreign affair, Congress may have considerably
less regulatory authority, and the question of whether the FISA exceeds that limited authority becomes relevant.
Although important consequences may flow from the distinction
between foreign and domestic affairs powers, the Supreme Court has
offered little guidance in discerning whether a given problem involves foreign or domestic affairs. "For constitutional lawyers as for
others, the line between domestic and foreign affairs is increasingly
fluid and uncertain, sometimes unreal, always at most a division of
emphasis and degree." 108 Two landmark cases illustrate this uncertainty in drawing a line between domestic and foreign affairs.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 109 the Supreme
Court held that a congressional resolution authorizing President
Roosevelt to embargo arms to countries at war in the Chaco and to
impose criminal penalties for violations of the embargo was not an
improper delegation oflegislative power. 110 This decision contrasted
sharply with the Court's contemporaneous decisions striking down
excessive delegations of legislative power to the executive in domestic affairs. 111 The different outcomes, according to Justice Suther106. See text at notes 119-21 infra, and notes 119 & 121 infra.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ l.
108. L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 8-9. See also Manning, The Congress, the Executive and
Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306 (1977); Nye, Independence and Interdependence, 22 FOREIGN POL. 129 (1976).
109. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
110. 299 U.S. at 322.
11 l. See, e.g:, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
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land, were the result of "fundamental differences between the
powers of the federal government in . . . foreign and external affairs
and those in ... domestic or internal affairs." 112 But the Court
failed to explain when a given action involved foreign affairs; it simply assumed that an arms embargo implicated the foreign affairs
powers.
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 113 the Court held
President Truman's wartime seizure of the steel mills invalid as an
improper executive exercise of legislative power vested in Congress
by Article I of the Constitution. 114 Despite the President's claim that
the seizure was necessary to avert a strike that would have
threatened the national defense, 115 the Court apparently treated the
seizure as a domestic affair. 116 Once again, no clear principle for
distinguishing foreign from domestic affairs emerged from the
Court's opinion.
Curtiss- Wright and Youngstown Sheet & Tube offer little explicit
guidance as to whether foreign intelligence surveillance within the
United States is foreign or domestic. Like an arms embargo or a
wartime plant seizure, this surveillance has both domestic and foreign impact, and is motivated by foreign policy objectives. Without
a clear indication from the Court, one can only observe that at least
in some circumstances - such as surveillance of a foreign spy within
the United States - foreign intelligence surveillance under the PISA
intuitively seems more foreign than domestic. 117 Relying on that inUnited States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431-32
(1935).
112. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
113. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE
CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
114. Article I, § I provides:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
115. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 14 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952), reprinted in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 589.
I 16. 343 U.S. 579, 585-86, 587-88; 343 U.S. at 597-607 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see L.
HENKIN, supra note I 00, at 340 n.11; Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President
and the Supreme Court, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 141, 175 (1952).
117. One could make a strong case to counter this intuition. Curtiss-Wright might be distinguished from Youngstown Sheet & Tube on the basis of congressional authorization; if Congress concurs in the President's invocation of inherent foreign affairs powers (as in CurtissWright), the Court may categorize the matter as foreign; if Congress opposes the action (as in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube), the Court may label it domestic. The point is that an action taken
under the foreign affairs power may invoke the unenumerated powers of sovereignty; the
Court is perhaps less hesitant to provide this extra-constitutional authority when the President
and Congress concur. Under this analysis, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act qualifies
as domestic legislation, not as congressional usurpation of the President's foreign affairs powers, because Congress has explicitly circumscribed the Preident's authority rather than approving the President's warrantless surveillance activities.
Another distinction that makes the FISA appear domestic is concern for individual liberties. When the President's action threatens individual rights (as in Youngstown Sheet & Tube,
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tuition, and thus assuming that foreign-intelligence gathering within
the United States is part of the conduct of foreign affairs, the question of who may control the federal government's extensive powers
in this area remains.
The allocation of foreign affairs powers between the President
and Congress is not clearly defi.ned. 118 The President exercises powers textually committed to him by the Constitution, 119 as well as
powers implied from these textual assigm:µents and powers inherent
in national sovereignty. The President alone exercises some of the
textually committed powers, such as making tactical decisions in
troop deployment, 120 and some of the textually implied powers, such
as recognizing or withdrawing recognition from foreign govemments.121 But Congress draws foreign affairs powers from these
three sources as well, and presidential powers are not always exclusive. Where congressional and presidential authority overlap, congressional power often controls if asserted. 122
which, according to Justice Douglas, 343 U.S. at 631-32, involved an unconstitutional taking of
property), the Court seems reluctant to ground presidential authority in extra-constitutional
foreign affairs powers. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 99. Since warrantless surveillances
clearly implicate personal liberties, this is a second reason to characterize the FISA as domestic.
However strong the arguments that the FISA should be considered domestic legislation for
purposes of constitutional analysis, the ambiguous legal distinction between foreign and domestic affairs precludes a conclusion of congressional authority based on this argument alone.
This Note therefore analyzes congressional power in its weakest light - under the assumption
that the FISA regulates foreign affairs.
118. The "modem" view of separation of powers does not contemplate a distinct, unalterable division of functions among totally independent branches of government, see, e.g.,
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
190-91 (1881), but adopts a more flexible and pragmatic approach, see, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. at 209 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 2:2-:6 (2d ed. 1978). The flexible approach was first suggested in the Federalist Papers, THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), and later by Mr. Justice Story, J.
STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 525 (5th ed. M.
Bigelow 1905).
119. The President is Co=ander in Chief of the armed forces, U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl.
I; he makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2; he
nominates and appoints ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2; and he receives ambassadors and other public ministers, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3.
120. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 51-54, 107-08; c.f. Dacosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146
(2d Cir. 1973) (court lacked power to review presidential decision to mine North Vietnamese
ports and harbors).
121. This power is implied from the President's power to appoint ambassadors, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and more directly from his authority to receive ambassadors and other
public ministers, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. E.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-30
(1942); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
122. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (footnotes omitted):
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
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Congress can muster authority to regulate foreign intelligence
surveillance from two sources: its share of the powers inherent in
national sovereignty, and its legislative powers under the Necessary
and Proper Clause of the Constitution. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice
Sutherland first theorized that some of the federal government's foreign affairs powers are inherent in national sovereignty rather than
derived from the enumerated powers constitutionally delegated to
the federal government by the states. 123 Although Justice Sutherland
suggested that many of the extra-constitutional foreign affairs powers belong to the President, 124 at least some of these powers of soveris uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law,
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by
our constitutional system.
On occasion Congress, with Supreme Court approval, has even totally deprived the executive of specific means of accomplishing his foreign policy objectives. For example, in Little v.
Barreme (The "Flying Fish"), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.), the Court
held that congressional action authorizing the President to order seizure of American vessels
bound to a French port thereby precluded the seizure of any American vessel bound from a
French port. Without this legislation the President, as Commander in Chief, might have empowered the Navy to seize all American vessels bound either to or from a French port during
the undeclared war with France.
123. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Sutherland had special interest in foreign relations, As a
United States Senator he had been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His
early lectures and writings anticipated the foreign/domestic distinction he propounded in Curtiss-Wright. See G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 24-47,
116-26 (1919); G. SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). For a history and criticism of
Sutherland's views, see Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis ofMr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
124. 299 U.S. at 319. Justice Sutherland's statement was dictum, of course; the result in
Curtiss-Wright did not depend on where the non-textual foreign affairs powers were placed
because both branches had acted concurrently. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Sutherland's sugges•
tion is supported only by the more limited statement of then-Congressman John Marshall that
"[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." IO ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). This position only gives the
President exclusive power to communicate with foreign governments. Of course, from his position of national spokesman the President necessarily "make(s] foreign policy" as he "conduct[s] foreign relations." L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 47. This, however, does not imply
that foreign policymaking is exclusively presidential. As Professor Henkin points out, "[t]he
Court has never considered how the powers inherent in national sovereignty are divided
among the branches." Id. at 324 n.28. Furthermore, at least some of these powers have been
validly exercised by Congress. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958) (''To deny
the power of Congress to enact the legislation challenged here [regulating "the relations of the
United States with foreign countries"] would be to disregard the constitutional allocation of
governmental functions that it is this Court's solemn duty to guard"). Perez was later overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), but no question of Congress' general power to
legislate the conduct of foreign affairs was raised in Afroyim. Notably, Justice Frankfurter,
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eignty have been exercised by and recognized as belonging to
Congress. 125 The Supreme Court has recognized this inherent congressional power to regulate foreign affairs, particularly when American citizens or residents are involved: "Although there is in the
Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no
doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the
Nation." 126 As Professor Henkin has observed, "[W]hatever the
President might do during authorized war or by international agreement, Congress alone can spend, authorize war, legislate and regulate generally within the United States, even in matters regarding
foreign affairs." 127 Congress can therefore draw authority to regulate executive branch foreign intelligence activities within the United
States from its share of the federal government's implicit powers of
sovereignty. 128
The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution may also
empower Congress to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance
within the United States. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants
Congress the power ''To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." 129 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this clause to permit varied congressional initiatives in the exercise of
the federal government's many powers. 130 Indeed, the Court identified this clause as the source of Congress's implicit foreign affairs
power: "Congress has broad power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to enact legislation for the regulation of foreign affairs." 131
The Necessary and Proper Clause carries added significance for the
conduct of foreign relations since it authorizes Congress to implement not just its own powers, but all powers vested in any branch of
writing for the Court in Perez, cited Curtiss-Wright as support for congressional authority to
legislate in foreign affairs. See generally Schlesinger, Congress and the Making ofAmerican
Foreign Policy, 51 FORElGN AFF. 78 (1972).
125. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 44 (1963) (dictum); Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
126. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).
127. L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 99.
128. Of course, this assumes that the FISA regulates foreign affairs; if not, Congress' domestic legislative power under article I is surely adequate to support the legislation. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, and text at notes 107-17 supra.
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
130. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
131. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). In Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920), for example, Justice Holmes found a basis in that clause for a statute
implementing a treaty which, it was assumed, Congress could not have enacted in the absence
of the treaty.
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the federal government. 132 Hence, Congress can direct the President
and regulate how he takes "Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 133 The clause thus legitimizes laws, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, that support and regulate the President's
foreign affairs and foreign intelligence activities. 134
Courts may also view the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
as necessary and proper to protect individual rights. Although the
Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress authority to advance
the freedoms guaranteed in the original Articles or in the Bill of
Rights, 135 the Preamble does state that one of the Constitution's purposes is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty," 136 and the separation of
powers established by the Constitution is largely directed toward
that end. 137 It would be anomalous to infer individual rights and
liberties from the structure and relationships of the Constitution 138
while not inferring congressional authority to promote and protect
those individual rights and liberties. 139 At times the Supreme Court
seems to recognize such a congressional power independent of the
enforcement provisions of constitutional amendments. 140 More
132. See W. VanAistyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (Spring 1976).
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See note 40 supra.
134. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 78. Congress has this power even when the President asserts authority to direct executive officers contrary to congressional order. In Kendall v,
United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), the Supreme Court ordered the
Postmaster-General to expend funds over President Jackson's objection. The Court stated:
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department,
the discharge of which is under the direction of the president. But it would be an alarming doctrine that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may
think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the
control of the law, and not to the direction of the president.
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610.
135. But compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. If the FISA governed actions by the
states, there would be no question that Congress could enact this legislation pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment.
136. U.S. CONST. Preamble. The Preamble, however, is not the source of any substantive
powers. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II, 22 (1905).
137. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 28, 41, 47, 51.
138. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969),
139. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 533-36 (1871) (The Necessary
and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to carry out unenumerated powers of the federal government; those powers are discerned by "considering the purposes they were intended to subserve"); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist [sic] with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional").
140. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)
(damages available for fourth amendment infringement inferred in the absence of congressional action; implying that Congress could have created a cause of action for damages for
fourth amendment violations had it so desired); 403 U.S. at 402-06 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(same); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369-71 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (Congress
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often, the Court simply assumes that Congress can protect constitutional rights through legislation. 141 The Necessary and Proper
Clause therefore justifies congressional passage of the PISA both because it is the textual source of congressional authority to regulate
foreign affairs and because it indicates that Congress has the power
to protect individual liberties.
Congress has adequate constitutional authority to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance. Both the Necessary and Proper
Clause and Congress's share of the foreign affairs powers inherent in
national sovereignty justify this regulation. Nevertheless, a court
still might balk at enforcing the PISA if the Act so intrudes upon
presidential power as to destroy his ability to protect the national
security. 142 But the Act is not that intrusive. The executive branch
still can collect foreign intelligence (albeit under limited judicial supervision), 143 and the exceptions to the strict warrant requirement 144
give the President needed flexibility. Nor does the Act fail to serve
the interest of privacy: requiring the executive branch to articulate
its reasons for electronic surveillance to a neutral arbiter is an accepted procedure for the protection of privacy. 145 Between the extremes of usurpation of presidential power and abandonment of
individual liberties, the courts should give great deference to congressional surveillance standards. 146 The legislative shift from the
"zone of twilight" 147 of section 2511 (3) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 148 to the clear standard of the PISA merits
judicial approval.
may distinguish between religious and nomeligious conscientious objectors in recognition of
first amendment values); cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (Congress may protect implicit right of ii!terstate travel from private interference regardless of its textual source).
141. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972);
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1976), held constitutional in, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 866 (1973).
142. The President's power to collect foreign intelligence was first recognized in Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1876).
143. Whether Congress could constitutionally abolish the President's surveillance powers
entirely is not considered here. Congress has shown no inclination to take such action; it has
always recognized the need for national security surveillances.
144. See text at notes 87-91 supra.
145. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Lacovara, supra note 10, at 12631.
146. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972); United
States v. Truong, No. 78-5176, slip. op. at 12 n.4 (4th Cir. July 17, 1980); compare United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
147. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson J., concurring).
148. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
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Judicial Competence to Grant Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Warrants: The Political Question Doctrine

By enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress
expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 149 While Congress
has some freedom to define the jurisdiction of the Article III
courts, 150 this power has constitutional limits. 151 Congress may not,
for example, insist on an advisory opinion from the courts, 152 nor
may it deprive the Supreme Court of the power to protect constitutional rights. 153 Between these extremes of ungrantable and undeniable jurisdiction, Congress usually can alter federal court
jurisdiction even if, in so doing, it changes the separation of powers.154 Nevertheless, the political question doctrine may prove a barrier to congressional attempts to shift powers to the courts.
Under the political question doctrine, courts will refuse to decide
an issue which "from its nature is not a subject for judicial determination." 155 Courts look to the constitutional allocation of powers
among the branches of government, to judicial expertise, and to their
149. If the plurality's view in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), is accepted, the power is one which existed but which the
courts had not previously exercised. Even if this view is not accepted, Congress has now defined the previously uncertain jurisdiction of the courts.
150. Article III, § I provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish . , , .
Article III, § 2, cl. 2 provides:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all
the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as the congress shall make.
151. Justice Curtis announced this position in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856):
(W]e do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from
its nature is not a subject for judicial determination. At the same time, there are matters,
involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper.
59 U.S. at 284. Accord, United States ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
152. E.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
153. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (only a court can impose a
final restraint on expressional activities); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-57 (1932)
(Hughes, C.J.), 285 U.S. at 86-88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
154. The Court in Murray's Lessee, for example, found that "[e]quitable claims to land by
the inhabitants of ceded territories form a striking instance of ... [the] class of cases" which
Congress may or may not bring before the courts. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). In La
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899), the Supreme Court held that
Congress could ask the judiciary to decide a question of fraud underlying a claim against
Mexico which the Executive itself might have decided. 175 U.S. at 459-61.
155. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284; see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
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own sense of prudence to determine the reviewability of constitutional controversies under this doctrine. 156 Although some commentators argue that the political question "excuse" for refusing to
exercise jurisdiction is grounded solely in public policy, 157 the
Supreme Court insists that the political questio.n standard is constitutionally based: 158 . ''The nonjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers." 159
The political question doctrine is pertinent to the FISA's constitutionality in two distinct ways: First, as discussed above, the doctrine determines whether the courts can resolve the Act's
constitutionality. 160 Assuming that they may, the doctrine then determines whether the Act is a constitutional delegation of authority
to the courts. 161 If issuing warrants for foreign intelligence surveillance involves political questions that Congress cannot delegate to
the judiciary, the FISA is unenforceable. 162 If, on the other hand,
these questions fall within judicial cognizance or "may be presented
in such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting," 163 the
Act is constitutional.
The Supreme Court best defined the political question doctrine
in Baker v. Carr:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political
question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
156. See text at notes 164 & 169 infra.
157. See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
158. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). But see United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 567 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
159. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
160. See text at notes 96-105 supra.
161. In the usual application of the political question doctrine the issue is whether a court
can resolve a question presented to it. The problem discussed in this part of the Note whether a congressional act is invalid because it would present the courts with political questions for their resolution - is admittedly not a typical application of the doctrine. The constitutional concerns underlying the doctrine, however, are well suited to a consideration of this
problem.
162. E.g., United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 48 (1851); Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
163. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1856).

1146

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:1116

political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 164

Although the Court in Baker denounced "sweeping statements to
the effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political
que~tions" 165 and concluded that it is "error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance," 166 the Court did cite, as examples of political questions, a number of foreign relations problems. 167 Of course, there is
often a need for executive discretion, nonjudicial standards, or a
"single-voiced statement of the Government's views" 168 in the area
of foreign relations. To decide whether these factors preclude the
judicial activity envisioned by the FISA, this Note applies three tests
suggested by Baker v. Carr: (1) "Does the issue involve resolution
of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government?"; (2) "Would resolution of the question
demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?"; and
(3) "Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?" 169
The Constitution commits the formulation and conduct of foreign policy to Congress and the President. 170 Although the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over "Cases affecting Ambassadors," 171 it recognizes that this is not an invitation to make foreign
policy for the other branches; foreign policy decisions are committed
to the unquestioned discretion of Congress and the President. 172 The
federal courts will only review whether Congress or the President
has the requisite authority to pass a law or take an action related to
foreign relations; the policy underlying the law or action is not sub164. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
165. 369 U.S. at 211, citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
166. 369 U.S. at 211.
167. 369 U.S. at 211, citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Doe v.
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855)
(Curtis, Cir. J.), qffd., 61 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1863).
168. 369 U.S. at 211 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884) (the
executive determines a person's status as a representative of a foreign government); United
States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 149 (1820) (standards for recognition of foreign
governments defy judicial treatment); Co=ercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923)
(need for finality in determining date of cessation of hostilities).
169. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). See also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3-16, at 71 n.1 (1978).
170. See text at notes 106-08, 118-34 supra.
171. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 2.
172. See, e.g. , Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Williams v. Suffolk Ins.
Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839); Occidental of U= al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain
Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Occidental of U= al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil
Co., 442 U.S. 928 (1979). Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, IO (1973) (control of military
forces is committed to the legislative and executive branches).

June 1980]

Note -

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

1147

ject to judicial review. 173
The Constitution's textual commitment of foreign policymaking
to the political branches implies that Congress could not use the
FISA to endow courts with pervasive authority to make foreign policy.174 Congress probably could not require courts to decide whether
the likelihood of successful surveillance and the foreign policy value
of the intercepted information outweigh the risk and costs of discovery. Nor could the courts unilaterally decide to exempt resident
aliens from allied countries from foreign intelligence surveillance.
The risks worth taking for a given piece of information and the preferred treatment of citizens of different nations are questions of foreign policy beyond the proper scope of judicial review. While many
court decisions will indirectly affect foreign policy, courts cannot directly intrude into the weighing of specific foreign policy considerations.
The FISA, however, does not require significant judicial intrusion into presidential foreign policymaking. The FISA directs
judges to make three findings, none of which entail excessive review.
First, the judge must find that the government has complied with the
formalities and procedures of the Act. 175 This involves routine,
unintrusive questions of jurisdictional fact. 176
Second, the judge is required to determine if "there is probable
cause to believe that- (A) the target of the electronic surveillance is
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power . . . ; and (B) each of
the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed
is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power." 177 This requirement interferes little with executive policymaking authority. The Government need show only that
a person (and place) falls within the class of persons (and places)
covered by the Act. It need not show probable cause that useful in173. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 213-14.
174. The opponents of the FISA feared that this was exactly what the Congress was doing.

See, e.g., Hearings on R.R. 7308 Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22 (1978) (statement of Laurence H. Silberman):
[T]he courts will be invited, indeed be obligated, to consider the following:
First: What information is necessary to protect the United States against attack or
other grave hostile acts? That is part of the definition of foreign intelligence. And that
implies authority to determine which foreign countries are hostile to the United States,
and I am certain after careful reading of some of these judicial opinions, there are certain
judges who would be delighted to make that determination. But I think it is wrong.
Second: What information, with respect to a foreign power, is deemed essential to the
defense of the Nation or the successful conduct of foreign affairs, which implies authority
to determine what is the successful conduct of foreign affairs?
See also 124 CONG. REc. Hl2,535 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (statement of Rep. McClory of
Illinois).
175. See FISA § 105(a)(l), (2) & (4) and note 79 supra.
176. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (jurisdictional facts are those whose
"existence is a condition precedent to the operation of a statutory scheme").
177. FISA § 105(a)(3).
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formation will be obtained or that national security is threatened. 178
Even under the minimal probable cause inquiry of the FISA, of
course, a court will occasionally refuse surveillance in circumstances
where the government desires it. But the degree of judicial intrusion
into foreign policymaking is minimal. And the significant fourth
amendment rights at issue justify that minimal intrusion.
Finally, if a United States person is the target of the requested
surveillance, the judge must find that the certifications of the executive officer179 (including his assurance that the information sought is
otherwise unavailable foreign intelligence information 180) "are not
clearly erroneous." 181 Even this clearly erroneous standard does not
require excessive intrusion into foreign policy making. The executive branch makes the original policy decision on the importance of
the surveillance and its necessity. The burden of proof for the executive officer can be easily met. 182 The executive branch need only
produce some evidence that its judgment is defensible in an ex parte
proceeding; 183 the judge can neither deny a warrant application that
meets these standards nor order a surveillance undesired by the executive branch. The PISA therefore passes the first "political question" test.
Even if the PISA does not compel the courts to exercise powers
committed by the Constitution to a coequal branch, the Act's procedures might still present a nonjusticiable political question if they
embrace judicially unmanageable standards. The need for judicially
manageable standards has been a common theme in political question cases. In Luther v. .Borden, 184 the Supreme Court was asked to
determine which of two competing governments was the "true" government of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court noted the staggering
evidentiary problems 185 (as well as the need for a single answer to
the question - an answer the President had already provided 186)
178. Only if the surveillance target is a United States person must the Government estab•
lish probable cause of criminal violation. FISA § I0I(b)(2). See notes 82-83 supra.
179. See note 79 supra.
180. FISA § IOI(e).
181. FISA § 105(a)(5).
182. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960), quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
183. This, nevertheless, protects individuals from a naked and unreviewable executive as•
sertion of national security. The required written application for judicial approval of surveil•
lance is expected to enhance protection of individual privacy. See Lacovara, supra note 10, at
127-28.
184. 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849).
185. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 41-42.
186. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44.
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and refused to resolve the dispute. In Coleman v. Miller, 187 the
Court in a plurality opinion refused to decide whether a proposed
constitutional amendment lapses into oblivion if not ratified within a
reasonable time. Chief Justice Hughes inquired rhetorically:
"Where are to be found the criteria for . . . judicial determination?" 188 Finally, in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 189 the Supreme Court held that federal courts could not apply
ordinary procedures for judicial review of administrative action to
presidential orders concerning international air routes: "[T]he very
nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions . . . are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy . . . . They are decisions of a kind for which
the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility . . . ."190
On the other hand, the Supreme Court will not employ the political question doctrine to avoid a problem that, although difficult, is
one of a type that courts regularly face. Although United States v.
Nixon, 191 which involved questions of access to the White House
tapes, had strong political overtones and compelled the Court to
scrutinize activities of a coequal branch of government, no serious
political question controversy arose because the issue of executive
privilege was "'of a type which [is] traditionally justiciable.' " 192
The questions that courts must consider under the FISA do not
seem 'judicially unmanageable." To certify compliance with the
Act, the judge makes findings of fact 193 that are part of the traditional judicial function. 194 The probable cause requirement 195 that the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power - is the crux of the required findings, and courts have had
long experience with this standard in other warrant proceedings. 196
187. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
188. 307 U.S. at 453.
189. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
190. 333 U.S. at 111.
191. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
192. 418 U.S. at 697, quoting United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949).
193. See text at notes 175-76 supra.
194. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); compare the requirements for a warrant under Title
Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1), (2)
(1976 & Supp. II 1978).
195. See text at note 177 supra.
196. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976) (probable cause requirements for a criminal surveillance warrant in Title ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968).
The Supreme Court has made clear that the probable cause standard is flexible, see
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967), and that Congress may prescribe
appropriate protective standards. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 322-23 (1972). The probable cause determinations required by the FISA are fairly easy
for courts to apply. The requirement of probable cause of criminal conduct for the surveillance of United States persons is similar to the standard for criminal surveillance warrants.
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Finally, the clearly erroneous standard for review of the certifications of the executive officer197 is familiar to federal courts. Essentially, the standard requires minimal review of the veracity of an ex
parte request; the executive officer need only provide adequate evidence to establish a reasonable belief that his certifications are correct.198 This, like the other two types of findings, is within the
judicial competence. All the standards of the FISA are judicially
manageable.
The final reason the Supreme Court labels some issues as political questions is one of prudence: should the Court, in its discretion,
resolve the issue? Because the prudential aspect of the political question doctrine is a matter of judicial discretion, 199 it is the least predictable of the doctrine's three inquiries.200 Nevertheless, none of
the "prudential" formulations of the political question doctrine in
Baker v. Carr201 justify rejecting the FISA. The first of these three
formulations - that resolving the issue would require courts to express "lack of respect due coordinate branches of government" seems inapplicable. To reject jurisdiction legislated by Congress
would entail as much disrespect for Congress as enforcing the Act
might entail for the executive.202 The concern of the second formulation - "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made" 203 - is resolved by the terms of the Act. In
emergencies (like that following a declaration of war), or exigent circumstances, the executive need not comply with the Act's general
requirements. 204 The third formulation - "the potential of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements"205 - seems equally irrelevant to the FISA. Because neither the President's application
nor the special court's response are public, no public confusion results, no private expectations are disturbed, and no interbranch conflict is apparent. Considerations of prudence, like those of deference
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976). The standard for all other persons requires only a factual
finding of criminal-type activities, FISA § lOl(b)(l)(B), or employment by a foreign power.
FISA § lOl(b)(l)(A). None of these probable cause determinations are beyond the judicial
cognizance.
197. See text at notes 179-83 supra.
198. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.02 (1972).
199. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 215-16.
200. For example, in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), Justice Frankfurter
successfully cautioned the Court "not to enter [the] political thicket" of voting district reapportionment, but he could not convince a majority of the Court on the same issue in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
201. 369 U.S. at 217, quoted in text at note 164 supra.
202. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of respect for a coordinate branch").
203. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
204. See text at notes 87-91 infra.
205. 369 U.S. at 217.
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and manageability, therefore do not require that courts refuse to enforce the FISA.
CONCLUSION

No single branch of government is especially "good" or especially "evil." All three branches of the federal government have disregarded or abused individual liberties at some time in American
history. 206 The separation of powers doctrine contemplates that all
branches of the federal government have a duty to protect personal
freedoms, 207 especially when those freedoms are challenged by a
claim as strong, and as legitimate, as preserving the national security.
Alexander Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers that the structure of the proposed government, accompanied by certain protections granted in the original articles of the Constitution,2°8 made a
Bill of Rights unnecessary. 209 Although this view was rejected with
the adoption of the first ten amendments, the importance of the separation of powers in protecting individual rights has not been displaced.
Interpreted properly, the separation of powers doctrine holds not
that each branch of government exercises exclusive powers, but
rather that the branches share powers so that each can check abuses
by the others. 210 The framers of the Constitution recognized both
that ambitious, overreaching people exist and come to power,211 and
that other people, committed to protecting individual liberties and
democracy, will choose to protect and preserve those liberties.212
Any power vested without limitation in one branch of the government creates a potential for abuse unchecked by the other
206. See, e.g., The Alien_ and Sedition Act, ch. 58, l Stat. 570 (1798) (congressional);
"Watergate" and "national security" surveillances and break-ins, sources cited in notes 21 &
27 supra (executive); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (judicial).
207. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18 (congressional power "to make all . . . Laws
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution .•."); U.S. CONST. art. II,§ I, cl. 8 (presidential oath to "preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (judicial refusal to give effect to congressional legislation inconsistent with the Constitution).
208. E.g., the Writ of Habeas Corpus, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; the prohibition of ex
post facto laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
209. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 84, 85, at 575-81, 587-88 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see generally G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 536-47 (1969).
210. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323-27 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison); see G. WOOD,
supra note 209, at 547-53.
211. "The supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude." THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513-14
(J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton). Accord, Scanlan, The Federalist and Human Nature, 21 REV.
OF POL. 657 (1959).
212. See generally Wright, The Federalist on the Nature of Political Man, 59 ETHICS l
(1949).
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branches.213
Under this interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act survives constitutional attacks. Congress has authority to protect fourth amendment privacy
interests by regulating the intelligence gathering activities of the
President. The Act protects this personal liberty without unduly
constraining foreign intelligence gathering in the United States. And
the role of courts in reviewing surveillance applications is both constitutional and reasonable. Because it strikes a reasonable and constitutional balance between fourth amendment rights and executive
authority to gather foreign intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is sustained, not defeated, by the doctrine of separation
of powers.

213. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332-35 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison).

